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Abstract: The fact of moral disagreement is often raised as a problem for moral realism. 
The idea is that disagreement amongst people or communities on moral issues is to be 
taken as evidence that there are no objective moral facts. While the fact of ‘folk’ moral 
disagreement has been of interest, the fact of expert moral disagreement, that is, widespread 
and longstanding disagreement amongst expert moral philosophers, is even more compelling. 
In this paper, I present three arguments against the anti-realist explanation for widespread 
and longstanding disagreement amongst expert moral philosophers. Each argument shows 
the argument from expert disagreement for moral anti-realism, that is, denial of morality’s 
objectivity, to be in one way or another self-undermining. I conclude that widespread and 
longstanding disagreement amongst expert moral philosophers is not a problem for moral 
realism.
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1. Introduction
Consider moral realism a genus of views whose species share each of the 
following three tenets:
(i) Moral sentences, statements, judgments, and beliefs are propositions capable 
 of being either true or false.
(ii) Some moral sentences, statements, judgments, beliefs, or propositions are true.
(iii) The truth-values of moral propositions are ‘stance-independent’ 
 (Shafer-Landau 2003: 15), meaning the truth or falsity of any given 
 moral proposition is independent of any person’s or groups’ attitudes, 
 preferences, or opinions toward it.
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The thesis of moral realism is the conjunction of these three sub-theses1 (McGrath 
2010: 60-61, Shafer-Landau 2006: 209, 2013: 54, Horn 2017: 363, Horn 2020). 
While specific realist accounts differ in how they further formulate themselves, 
they are all species of the genus moral realism, and so inherit their genus’ essential 
features. Understood this way, moral realism is a genus of meta-ethical views on 
which morality is an objective2 matter in that moral beliefs have non-relativistic 
truth-values and at least some of those beliefs are true (Wedgwood 2014: 23). 
Accordingly, there are objective moral facts, and moral questions have objectively 
true answers. One may understand moral anti-realism as the opposite of this. Simply, 
moral anti-realism is the denial of the objectivity of morality, and therefore the denial 
of the claim that there are objective moral facts or objectively correct answers to 
moral questions.
One of the major challenges for moral realism is explaining why there remains 
widespread and longstanding disagreement amongst expert moral philosophers. 
Moral philosophers as a community disagree on issues ranging from questions 
about general moral principle and theories (such as utilitarianism or deontology) to 
questions about particular moral issues (such as what we ought to do about climate 
change, or whether abortion is wrong, etc.). After all, it seems reasonable to expect 
experts to tend towards consensus on the issues they have expertise in. This does not 
appear to be the case in moral philosophy. Moral philosophers disagree on a range 
of topics pertaining to morality and have disagreed on such matters for centuries.
When laypeople disagree on some issue, it is reasonable to think that such 
disagreement is a result of at least one party’s epistemic failing. It is also 
reasonable to think that when one is an expert on some issue, they will not suffer 
the same epistemic failings as laypeople. We might then think there would be less 
disagreement on issues between those who are experts on those issues than there is 
between laypeople. However, this is not the case with moral philosophy. There is 
widespread and longstanding disagreement between expert moral philosophers, that 
is, those who are educated in and supposedly knowledgeable about issues in moral 
philosophy. If moral philosophy is a domain in which even the supposed experts 
radically disagree, what does this indicate about the objectivity of morality? 
In this paper, I present three arguments against the anti-realist explanation of 
widespread and longstanding disagreement amongst expert moral philosophers. First, 
I argue that arguments from expert disagreement face a problem of overgeneralization 
that leads to their self-undermining. If we accept the abductive inference from 
expert disagreement to moral anti-realism, we can construct an analogous argument 
from meta-ethical disagreement to show that moral anti-realism is false. Second, 
because the moral anti-realist makes a probabilistic abductive inference from expert 
disagreement to moral anti-realism, theirs is an ‘inference to the best explanation’ 
style argument. I show that this sort of argument for moral anti-realism is also self-
undermining as it allows enough normativity to posit objective moral facts. Third, 
I consider how both agreement and disagreement have been used to arrive at an 
1 Sarah McGrath (2010: 60-61) calls these conjuncts the ‘Cognitivism’ thesis, the ‘No Error Theory’ 
thesis, and the ‘Objectivity’ thesis, corresponding to (i), (ii), and (iii), respectively.
2 I use ‘objective’ to mean, and in place of, ‘stance-independent’.
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anti-realist conclusion and argue that neither has any evidential value for moral 
anti-realism or against moral realism. I conclude that widespread and longstanding 
disagreement amongst expert moral philosophers is not a problem for moral realism.
2. Expert disagreement, and the state of moral philosophy
Pioneered by John L. Mackie (1977), standard arguments from disagreement 
have typically focused on interpersonal and cross-cultural disagreement, or ‘folk’ 
disagreement. David Enoch (2009) has argued that a variety of these folk arguments 
from disagreement do not pose a threat to moral realism. However, the argument 
I wish to consider here differs from these more familiar arguments from folk 
disagreement. The central concern is the disagreement and lack of consensus amongst 
experts. When laypeople disagree on some issue, say, whether vaccines are safe and 
effective, or the shape of the earth, or whether evolution explains the diversity of 
life on earth, the source of the disagreement is that at least one party is in error. The 
error in play will be some sort of epistemic shortcoming or defect, such as being 
ignorant of some relevant facts, being biased or prejudiced toward certain pieces of 
evidence or argument, being dogmatic, etc. Folk disagreement is often due to these 
kinds of epistemic errors. Things are different when talking to medical professionals, 
or geologists, or biologists. The difference is that we expect these people not to be 
in the sort of disagreement often seen between laypeople. This is because medical 
professionals, geologists, and biologists are experts in their respective fields. If 
there is a tendency amongst practitioners of a certain discipline of inquiry toward 
consensus it is sometimes taken as a sign their discipline is an objective one in the 
sense that it arrives at objectives truths. It is sometimes taken as a reason in favour 
of the reliability of a discipline’s methodologies that they result in or tend towards 
consensus amongst experts in that discipline. It would be most perplexing to see so-
called experts locked in widespread and longstanding disagreement, and it would be 
concerning to see them in such a state if their respective discipline was one which 
purported to aim at and reveal objective truths. The discipline of moral philosophy 
is exactly in this predicament.
What is to be made of the fact that there is such widespread and radical disagreement 
amongst expert moral philosophers? One possible explanation is simply that radical 
disagreement amongst moral philosophers is a result of morality’s lack of objectivity. 
This would mean the thesis of moral realism, the family of views which takes morality 
to be an objective matter, is false. Taking this explanation seriously is to jettison the 
idea that morality is an objective matter, and therefore espouse moral anti-realism. 
Brian Leiter (2014) takes such an approach and defends Nietzsche’s version of the 
argument from disagreement for the denial of the objectivity of morality, arguing that 
anti-realism about morality is the best explanation for widespread and longstanding 
moral disagreement amongst expert moral philosophers. It is an argument from expert 
disagreement. If it is the case that moral philosophers throughout history can engage 
in moral theorizing, but after centuries still not arrive at a consensus all the while 
radically disagreeing with each other, it would appear there is neither movement 
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toward rapprochement between the competing moral traditions (Leiter 2014: 140) 
and thus no progress in moral philosophy, nor that moral facts are epistemically 
accessible. Thus, we cannot reasonably posit objective moral facts.
The Nietzschean anti-realist explanation for this is that morality is not an objective 
domain. Looking at the most sophisticated moral theories of the Western analytic 
philosophical tradition, Nietzsche observes that a group of moral philosophers who 
share similar beliefs, practices, and many of the same judgments on concrete moral 
cases, remain in radical disagreement on the most important and foundational matters 
of moral theory (Leiter 2014: 134-135). Leiter (2014: 131) describes this as “the 
single most important and embarrassing fact about the history of moral theorizing by 
philosophers over the last two millennia”.
Nietzsche’s observation is equally pertinent to contemporary moral theory as it is 
to the history of moral philosophy. In recent empirical work, David Bourget and David 
J. Chalmers (2014) published results of a survey of 1,972 professional philosophers 
from around the world (though with an acknowledged analytic and Anglo-centric 
bias) asking what philosophical views they held on 30 central philosophical issues. 
The issue of ‘Normative Ethics’ produced the following results: “deontology 25.9%; 
consequentialism 23.6%; virtue ethics 18.2%; other 32.3%” (Bourget and Chalmers 
2014: 476). As is evident from Bourget’s and Chalmers’ survey results, Nietzsche’s 
observation about professional moral philosophers in the Western analytic tradition 
holds for contemporary moral philosophers as well, for the empirical evidence shows 
they are in radical disagreement.
I take the Nietzschean view to be essentially denying moral philosophy’s status 
as a Wissenschaft, and therefore denying the possibility for moral theorists to find 
anything like ‘objective truth’ in their endeavour. If moral philosophy is not a 
Wissenschaft, then moral theorizing is not genuine inquiry aiming at truth. One of 
Nietzsche’s principal critiques of the history of moral philosophy is that the variety of 
moral theories Nietzsche’s targets think can be dialectically justified are “necessarily 
sophistical” (Nietzsche in Kaufmann and Hollingdale 1968: 233). Nietzsche seems 
to mean that while attempts at the dialectical justification of the central and enduring 
moral philosophies of the Western analytic tradition can be made, all such attempts 
will fail (Leiter 2014: 138). Moral philosophy contrasts with other disciplines. Other 
disciplines, such as the natural sciences, do not appear to have the problem Nietzsche 
observes in moral philosophy. These other disciplines are Wissenschaft, while 
widespread and longstanding disagreement amongst expert moral philosophers 
makes evident that moral philosophy is not, at least for Nietzsche. So, we can make 
an abductive inference from the radical disagreement between experts to an anti-
realist conclusion about morality.
If it is the case that moral philosophers as a community disagree about P, where 
P is some moral proposition, and such disagreement has been widespread and 
longstanding, then we are, after weighing the anti-realist explanation against realist 
ones, to say that there is no objective fact of the matter about P (Wedgwood 2014: 
26). This is to be taken as the best explanation for the disagreement between moral 
philosophers.
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3. Why think moral philosophers are experts?
The discussion is framed in terms of expert moral disagreement where moral 
philosophers are the relevant experts. But why should we think moral philosophers 
are ‘experts’ at all?3 Some empirical evidence suggests that moral philosophers show 
similar order effects on their judgments about hypothetical moral scenarios to those 
of laypeople (Schwitzgebel and Cushman 2012). There is also evidence that the 
phenomenon of rationalization, where one favours a particular conclusion and whose 
subsequent search of justification is biased in favour of that conclusion, is pervasive 
among both laypeople’s and moral philosophers’ thought (Schwitzgebel and Ellis 
2017). If moral philosophers do not considerably outperform laypeople in tests of 
certain biases, then there are some grounds to think that moral philosophers are not 
experts in moral reasoning. If moral philosophers are not experts, then widespread 
and longstanding disagreement amongst them can be explained in the same way 
as disagreement amongst laypeople. We can say that disagreement amongst moral 
philosophers is explained by the same epistemic shortcomings and failings that 
would explain disagreement amongst laypeople. Thus, the argument from expert 
disagreement would lose much of its force because there would be nothing especially 
problematic about expert disagreement that was not already problematic about folk 
disagreement. But because folk disagreement is easily explained away, so too would 
be expert disagreement. 
Whether to consider moral philosophers experts depends upon what we take 
expertise to be. Moral philosophers throughout history have painstakingly engaged 
in rigorous and methodical reasoning to inquire into and investigate questions about 
morality. For centuries, moral philosophers have inquired into moral questions with 
the kind of effort and rigour that at least resemble the way experts go about inquiry in 
other disciplines. One would expect moral philosophers to have a better understanding 
of major theories, views and accounts of morality, a better understanding of the 
arguments and objections for and against different moral positions, and the creative 
and critical thinking skills to better theorize about moral issues compared to 
laypeople. Each of theses capacities looks to be a sign of something like expertise.
But, if moral philosophers are not experts, what exactly does all the painstaking 
and rigorous methodological reasoning and inquiry mean for the label of ‘moral 
philosopher’? While empirical evidence shows ways in which moral philosophers 
do not considerably outperform laypeople in tests of biases, it seems to me that moral 
philosophers are nevertheless better at thinking about moral issues and at moral 
reasoning than laypeople, all things considered, even if they are similarly susceptible 
to certain biases. Moral philosophers do seem to have a body of knowledge and skills 
others lack. This body of knowledge and skills seems to me to plausibly constitute 
some manner of expertise.
What matters for this paper is that moral philosophers are considered experts in 
the sense that they as a community have spent centuries rigorously inquiring into a 
wide range of moral issues and topics. This practice of rigorous inquiry sufficiently 
3 I thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this point.
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distinguishes moral philosophers from laypeople for purposes of investigating why 
there persists widespread disagreement amongst them. The question is whether the 
domain of moral philosophy is an objective one with objective moral facts given it 
has not produced the same sort of consensus amongst its experts that is seen in other 
expert populated domains, such as the natural sciences.
4. Why expert disagreement is no problem for moral realism
Thus far, I explained the argument from expert disagreement and discussed 
the sense in which moral philosophers are experts. In this section, I provide three 
arguments for why the argument from expert disagreement is self-undermining. 
Section 4.1 focuses on overgeneralization. In section 4.2 I show how ‘inference to 
the best explanation’ style arguments for moral anti-realism opens the door to moral 
realism. Section 4.3 argues that disagreement could be used to support moral realism 
and thus is most likely not evidence for either anti-realism or realism.
4.1. Overgeneralization
The problem Nietzsche observes is not particular to moral philosophy. Insofar 
as it is a problem, it is a problem for philosophy generally. Disagreement runs 
rampant in all areas of philosophy, not just in moral philosophy. Consider again 
the empirical data. In Bourget and Chalmers’ (2014) survey, only 14 of the total 30 
major philosophical issues asked about received for their respective top answers a 
response rate of at least 50%. So, it appears that radical disagreement amongst experts 
exists for most of the central issues in philosophy.4 The empirical evidence indicates 
that the sort of problem Nietzsche points out is not unique to moral philosophy, 
but a problem with philosophy more generally. Following the Nietzschean line of 
reasoning, one must conclude general anti-realism about philosophy as a discipline 
that aims toward truths. One could argue that if general philosopher A believes 
P, where P is some general non-moral philosophical proposition, and general 
philosopher B believes that ~P, then we should think there is no objective truth of 
the matter regarding P. We could do this for all non-moral propositions meant to 
be answers to philosophical questions. If we accept disagreement amongst moral 
philosophers as grounds for moral anti-realism, then we have grounds for general 
philosophical anti-realism, including for areas of philosophy for which anti-realism 
is thought to be independently implausible (Risberg and Tersman 2019: 2). 
Overgeneralization to philosophy is not the only threat to the argument from 
expert disagreement. David O. Brink (1989) has raised the issue of overgeneralization 
by appealing to disagreements in other domains. Brink (1989: 197) states, “no one 
concluded from the apparently quite deep disagreement among astronomers a short 
while ago about the existence of black holes that there was no fact of the matter 
4  Even if we do not think the issues listed in Bourget and Chalmer’s survey are an exhaustive list of 
the central issues in philosophy, there is enough disagreement in enough of the central issues to say 
that there is widespread disagreement is philosophy generally.
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concerning the existence of black holes”. Brink points out that disagreement amongst 
expert astronomers does not count as strong evidence for there being no objective 
facts about celestial objects. Similarly, the same sort of disagreement amongst moral 
philosophers should not be taken as evidence that there are no objective moral facts.
The way the argument from expert disagreement overgeneralizes to philosophy 
also leads to its self-undermining. As Eric Sampson (2019) argues, because there 
is widespread and longstanding disagreement in ethics, metaphysics, epistemology, 
or any other area of philosophy, and metaphysical and epistemological premises 
are used in arguments from disagreement, arguments from disagreement are self-
undermining. So, for Sampson, widespread disagreement in philosophy is a problem 
for arguments from disagreement against moral realism because these arguments 
depend upon metaphysical and epistemological assumptions. But if disagreements 
amongst expert philosophers show anti-realism about the areas on which they 
disagree, then those metaphysical and epistemological assumptions are false, and 
those arguments fail. So, the argument from expert disagreement faces a problem 
of overgeneralization that leads to its self-undermining. To address this problem 
of overgeneralization, one would have to deny that philosophy, in general, is a 
Wissenschaft, which is plausibly an unacceptable consequence. 
While Brink’s argument compares meta-ethics to astronomy and other natural 
sciences, and Sampson’s argument focuses on the metaphysical and epistemological 
underpinnings of arguments from disagreement to show them to be self-undermining, 
there is another way to show the self-undermining nature of arguments that appeal to 
disagreements amongst expert philosophers. We do not need to look to disagreements 
in the natural sciences, metaphysics, or epistemology to show that anti-realism 
in meta-ethics is false. Instead of analogizing between disagreements in moral 
philosophy and disagreements in the natural sciences, metaphysics, or epistemology, 
we can appeal do disagreements in meta-ethics itself. I present here an argument 
appealing to meta-ethical disagreement, that is, disagreement about what the correct 
meta-ethical theory is, to show that the argument from expert disagreement cannot 
support moral anti-realism.5
Consider that moral anti-realism is a meta-ethical position. Now consider the 
following argument for meta-ethical anti-realism (a metameta-ethical position). 
P1. If there is widespread and longstanding disagreement amongst expert 
 meta-ethicists or philosophers about what the correct meta-ethical theory is, 
 then we can abductively infer that there are no objective meta-ethical facts.6
P2. There is widespread and longstanding disagreement amongst expert meta- 
 ethicists and philosophers about what the correct meta-ethical theory is.
C.  We can abductively infer that there are no objective meta-ethical facts.
5 Similar arguments that arguments from disagreement problematically generalize to meta-ethics can 
be found in Huemer (2005), Enoch (2009), and Shafer-Landau (2006).
6 That is, objective facts about how ethical thought and talk, and what that thought and talk is about, 
fits into reality (McPherson and Plunkett 2018: 3).
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If disagreement amongst expert moral philosophers is to be taken as support for 
moral anti-realism, then disagreement amongst expert meta-ethicists should be taken 
as support for the metameta-ethical position of meta-ethical anti-realism. Given that 
there is obviously disagreement amongst meta-ethicists on the correct meta-ethical 
theory, the moral anti-realist who appeals to expert disagreement must also accept 
meta-ethical anti-realism. But, if meta-ethical anti-realism is true, then there is no 
fact of the matter about what meta-ethical theory is true. If no meta-ethical theory is 
true and moral anti-realism is a meta-ethical theory, then moral anti-realism is not 
objectively true. The appeal to the fact of expert disagreement for moral anti-realism 
undermines moral anti-realism. Thus, the appeal to expert disagreement does not 
create a problem for moral realism due to its self-undermining nature.
Thomas Pölzler (forthcoming) states that moral anti-realists could not bite the bullet 
against overgeneralization arguments for the self-undermining of the argument from 
disagreement and accept meta-ethical anti-realism. The argument from disagreement 
cannot be reconciled with meta-ethical anti-realism, that is, anti-realism about the 
moral realism/moral anti-realism debate. Pölzler notes that if there were no objective 
truth about whether there were objective facts, moral realism would be defeated, 
but so would moral anti-realism. So, biting the bullet is not something a moral anti-
realist can do about overgeneralization arguments for the self-undermining nature of 
the argument from expert disagreement.
A stronger strategy against overgeneralization arguments for the self-undermining 
nature of the argument from disagreement is to explore the best explanations for 
disagreement in non-moral domains. Pölzler (forthcoming) argues that realism is the 
best explanation for disagreements in non-moral matters even when such disagreement 
is widespread and longstanding, but it is not in the case of morality. Pölzler argues that 
in non-moral domains such as, say, history or physics, disagreements can be explained 
in realist terms without invoking epistemic inaccessibility of those domains’ facts. 
Perhaps available historical sources cannot bring historians to a confident conclusion 
on some issues. This would not entail anti-realism about historical facts. Physicists 
might disagree about the truth of some theory not because there is no objective 
truth about the theory but because the technical equipment to test the predictions 
of the theory may not have been developed yet. Additionally, non-moral facts, such 
as physical facts of string theory seem to explain other phenomena apart from our 
judgements about physical phenomena. So, there is prima facie reason to be realists 
about, say, physical facts and historical events, where there is no such presumption 
about morality (Pölzler forthcoming).
But why treat moral philosophers differently from physicists or historians? Why 
not explain disagreement amongst expert moral philosophers with appeals to, e.g. 
the difficulty of doing moral philosophy, or the challenge of inquiry about issues 
that can often be socially and emotionally charged, or complexities of moral and 
philosophical arguments, theories, and views? Moral questions are amongst the 
deepest and enduring questions of human life. There is no reason to think answers 
to them will come easy. We could then say there is prima facie reason to be realists 
about morality despite longstanding disagreement because moral philosophy is 
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difficult, even for the expert moral philosophers. We could maintain that moral 
philosophers are experts just as we can maintain that historians and physicists are 
experts even when they are engaged in disagreement. So, the fact of widespread and 
longstanding disagreement amongst moral philosophers can be treated in the same 
way as disagreement amongst historians and physicists because the difficulty of 
moral philosophy gives us prima facie reason to be realists about morality, similarly 
to how we have prima facie reason to be realists about, say, history and physics.  
Additionally, the phenomenology of moral disagreement lends in favour of 
objective moral facts, and thus moral realism, as well. As Enoch (2011) argues, 
preferential disagreements call for impartiality and compromise while disagreements 
about objective facts are not amenable to compromise the way disagreements about 
mere preference are. Imagine you and a partner encounter a dying animal on the 
side of the street. It is your moral belief that animals ought not to needlessly suffer 
and you together ought to help the suffering animal. Your partner believes that 
animal suffering is not morally significant and helping it would come at a cost to 
both of you, so your partner believes you together ought not to help the suffering 
animal. What sort of compromise would be appropriate here? In cases of preferential 
disagreements, compromise is welcome. But in cases of factual disagreements, 
it is not. The moral case is more like the factual case because impartial solutions 
do not work in either. Instead, you are justified in ‘standing your ground’ (Enoch 
2011: 23) and ensuring you do not proceed in a way that will increase the animal’s 
suffering (that is, proceeding in the way you take to be immoral). The proper way to 
proceed in cases of moral disagreement is more analogous to the way to proceed in 
disagreements about objective facts, rather than the way to proceed in disagreements 
of mere preference (Enoch 2011: 24). That moral disagreements are more analogous 
to disagreements about objective facts, and that moral philosophy is difficult, even 
for expert moral philosophers, is prima facie support for objective moral facts and 
moral realism. Thus, contra to Pölzler’s claim, it is not the case that there is prima 
facie reason to be realists about, say, physics and history, but not about morality.
The importance of this is that anti-realists cannot claim that anti-realism is not 
always the best explanation for widespread and longstanding disagreement in all 
cases but is in the case of moral philosophy. They cannot do this because they must 
show there to be a relevant difference between moral disagreement and relevant non-
moral disagreements. If other non-moral disagreements are not best explained by 
anti-realism because there is prima facie reason to be realists about those non-moral 
domains, then expert moral disagreements are not best explained by anti-realism 
because there is prima facie reason to be realists about morality. If an anti-realist were 
to maintain that anti-realism was not the best explanation for radical disagreement 
in some non-moral domain but was the best explanation for disagreement in moral 
philosophy, the burden of proof would be on them to give a non-question-begging 
explanation of the relevant differences between that non-moral domain and moral 
philosophy. The worry then is that whatever this difference is alleged to be would 
likely show that expert disagreement does not provide independent reason for moral 
anti-realism, as an anti-realist moral domain and realist non-moral domains would 
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be distinguished not by the fact of moral philosophers disagreeing but by whatever 
this other difference is. The moral anti-realist would be abandoning the argument 
from expert disagreement, and thus conceding expert disagreement is not a problem 
for moral realism. 
Pölzler (forthcoming) notes that “proponents of the self-defeat objection may 
be right that those advocating the argument from moral disagreement cannot adopt 
anti-realism about the existence of objective moral truths and the soundness of this 
argument, and that there is widespread and persistent disagreement about these 
matters”, and offers another strategy to show overgeneralization arguments for 
the self-undermining nature of the argument from disagreement do not lead to the 
argument from disagreement’s self-defeat. Pölzler argues that disagreements in meta-
ethics need not lead to meta-ethical anti-realism because they can be explained by 
cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1957), and philosopher’s susceptibility to cognitive 
biases (Schwitzgebel and Cushman 2015), order effects (Schwitzgebel and Cushman 
2012), and rationalization (Schwitzgebel and Ellis 2017). The susceptibility to 
cognitive and epistemic errors makes plausible that moral philosophers have not 
recognized the soundness of the objective truth of moral anti-realism. Meta-ethical 
realism may be true, so there is an objective fact about what the correct meta-ethical 
theory is, and that theory is moral anti-realism. 
But the same could be said in support of moral realism. Perhaps it is moral 
anti-realists who are more affected by cognitive dissonance, cognitive bias, and 
rationalization that prevent them from seeing that expert disagreement does not 
undermine moral realism. It is not made clear why moral realists would be more 
susceptible to cognitive errors than moral anti-realists, or how such cognitive errors 
undermine the existence of objective moral facts. If the idea here is that moral realists 
have a desire to ground first-order moral commitments in objective facts while anti-
realists have no such desire, it is contradicted by way of a counterexample. Consider 
the following quote by a serial killer and moral anti-realist, Ted Bundy:
“I discovered that to become truly free, truly unfettered, I had to become 
truly uninhibited. And I quickly discovered that the greatest obstacle 
to my freedom, the greatest block and limitation to it, consists in the 
insupportable “value judgment” that I was bound to respect the rights of 
others… Surely, you would not, in this age of scientific enlightenment, 
declare that God or nature has marked some pleasures as “moral” or 
“good” and others as “immoral” or “bad”?” (Ted Bundy as quoted in 
Jaffa 1990: 3-4).
If the charge against moral realists is that they are engaged in motivated 
reasoning, meaning they defend moral realism because they want their first-order 
moral commitments to be objective, some moral anti-realists are worthy of the same 
accusation. In the above quote, Ted Bundy argues against some pleasures being 
‘moral’ while others ‘immoral’ from what appears to be a desire to vindicate his 
view of what it means for him to be ‘truly free’. Bundy’s moral anti-realist view is 
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motivated by his desire to “become truly free, truly unfettered,…truly uninhibited”. 
I do not mean to compare moral anti-realists to serial killers. What I mean to show 
is that if motivated reasoning increases one’s susceptibility to cognitive error, then 
moral realists and moral anti-realists are in the same boat. Moral realists may have a 
desire to ground first-order commitments to objective facts while some moral anti-
realists may have a desire to jettison objective morality because they view it as, for 
example, an obstacle to achieving selfish hedonistic ends. It is not clear that moral 
realists are any more susceptible to cognitive error than moral anti-realists because 
both can engage in motivated reasoning. Even if it were true that moral realists 
are more susceptible to cognitive error due to a desire to ground first-order moral 
commitments in objective facts, no conclusion about the correct meta-ethical theory 
could be drawn from this fact. It can both be true that moral realists are engaged in 
motivated reasoning and that their arguments in defence of their view are sound. 
What matters is the substance of the arguments, rather than the possible motives of 
the proponents of those arguments.
Further, whatever susceptibility moral realists have to various biasing cognitive 
errors does not explain why the argument from disagreement does not generalize 
to meta-ethics. While it could be true that meta-ethical realism is true and moral 
anti-realism is true, if the support for moral anti-realism is the argument from 
expert moral disagreement, then it still looks like it overgeneralizes to meta-ethics, 
meaning it supports meta-ethical anti-realism. And if meta-ethical anti-realism is 
true, then moral anti-realism is false. Thus, the argument from expert disagreement 
overgeneralizes in a way that is self-undermining.
Contra to Pölzler’s claim that a moral anti-realist could not bite the bullet on the 
overgeneralization argument, a moral anti-realist sympathetic to a Nietzschean view 
could accept the consequence that philosophy, moral or otherwise, is not an endeavour 
that can deliver objective truth understood as the aim of a Wissenschaft. In doing 
so, they would embrace general philosophical anti-realism. If the argument from 
expert disagreement generalizes to philosophy and leads to general philosophical 
anti-realism, an anti-realist could say philosophy, in general, is not proper inquiry 
towards objective truth. Perhaps philosophy’s nature is closer to that of an aesthetic 
pursuit than it is to that of the natural sciences. Aesthetic pursuits are not in any 
obvious way systematic inquiries toward truth. They are, however, creative and often 
expressive activities rather than facts or reasons.7 But this faces a metaphilosophical 
problem. If philosophy is not an inquiry towards truth, then no philosophical 
positions are true. The position that philosophy is not inquiry towards truth is a 
metaphilosophical position, that is, it is a thesis about the activity called philosophy. 
But metaphilosophy is a branch of philosophy, meaning metaphilosophical positions 
are philosophical positions. So, if the position that philosophy is not inquiry towards 
 
7 The assumption here is that aesthetic values are not to be understood realistically. However, this 
may be a mistake. Perhaps the idea of aesthetic realism ought to be taken more seriously, especially 
by those who wish to be moral realists (see Hanson 2018). So, perhaps the realist has no problem 
viewing philosophy, including moral philosophy, as aesthetic endeavor as they may preserve the 
existence of some objective normative facts.  
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truth is a philosophical position, and if it is true, then at least one philosophical 
position is true. If at least one philosophical position is true, then philosophy is an 
inquiry towards truth. Therefore, philosophy is an inquiry towards truth.8 Widespread 
disagreement in philosophy does not undermine its status as an inquiry towards truth. 
So, the moral anti-realist who wishes to bite the bullet of overgeneralization to 
philosophy and take on general philosophical anti-realism cannot do so. If the moral 
anti-realist cannot do this, and they have no other answer to the argument from expert 
disagreement’s problem of overgeneralization to other domains where there is or 
has been widespread and longstanding disagreement, such as astrophysics, physics, 
history, metaphysics, epistemology, and meta-ethics, then the overgeneralization 
argument succeeds and widespread disagreement amongst expert moral philosophers 
does not undermine the existence of objective moral facts.
4.2. Inference to the best explanation
The moral anti-realist draws probabilistic connections between longstanding 
disagreement on the foundational moral question and whether there are any objective 
moral facts. The inference being made is one of the best explanations. The notion is 
that widespread and longstanding disagreement amongst expert moral philosophers 
is best explained by moral anti-realism. Otherwise, moral philosophers would 
have converged on an answer by now. But moral anti-realism cannot be the best 
explanation here. This is because ‘inference to the best explanation’ style arguments 
for moral anti-realism are self-undermining. 
If there are competing explanations for radical disagreement, then there must 
be some method of vetting each to determine the correct one. This suggests a 
background standard for discriminating between possible explanations. If it is 
the case that any explanation is the best explanation, and its status as such is non-
arbitrary, non-relativistic, and not stance-dependent, then there appears to be at least 
one objective normative fact. Specifically, there is an objective normative fact about 
what is the best explanation for radical disagreement amongst moral philosophers. 
If the moral anti-realist wants to say their explanation is the best one, they will have 
undermined their moral anti-realism by positing an objective normative fact. By 
conceding some normativity, the moral anti-realist will have opened the door to the 
reasonable possibility of objective moral facts.
One may contend that the sort of normative fact presupposed by the existence 
of best explanations is not a moral or ethical one, but an epistemic one. The move 
from best explanations to objective moral facts appears to depend on an equivocation 
between ‘best’ in a moral sense and ‘best’ in an epistemic sense. Because the anti-
realist is concerned with morality rather than epistemology, they have no problem 
positing enough normativity for there to be objective epistemic facts because doing 
 
8 Russ Shafer-Landau (2006) argues from this premise to moral realism. He argues because moral 
philosophy is a species of the genus philosophy it inherits philosophy’s essential features, including 
its status as Wissenschaft. Thus, moral philosophy is inquiry towards objective truth. If that is the 
case, there are objective moral facts and moral realism is true.
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so does not commit them to positing objective moral facts. However, the ontological 
cost of objective moral facts will have already been paid. If we accept there are 
objective epistemic facts, the step to positing objective moral facts is not a large 
one. As Enoch (2011: 92-93) has argued, once some normative facts are accepted 
there are no reasons to not accept moral ones, as there is no further ontological price 
to pay for moral facts once one has paid for normative facts. By allowing enough 
normativity for the existence of epistemic facts, ‘inference to the best explanation’ 
style arguments pave the road to objective moral facts. This happens by way of 
opening the door to ‘companions in guilt’ arguments. These arguments come in a 
variety of forms, but their basic thrust is to show a strong analogy between morality 
and other domains for which anti-realism is considered for one reason or another 
implausible, such as, epistemology, mathematics, philosophy, etc. Terence Cuneo 
(2007) argues that if objective moral facts do not exist, then objective epistemic 
facts do not either. But objective epistemic facts do exist. So, objective moral facts 
also exist and moral realism is true. Similarly, Nathan Nobis (2005) argues that if 
epistemic realism is true, then so too is moral realism. Richard Rowland (2013), 
while not arguing directly for moral realism, employs a similar argument against 
a kind of moral anti-realism (ethical error theory). Rowland argues that if there are 
no categorical normative reasons, then there are no epistemic reasons for belief, but 
there are epistemic reasons for belief, so there are categorical reasons, thus ethical 
error theory is false. If we can posit categorical normative reasons, then we can posit 
categorical moral reasons as there is nothing objectionably distinct about the moral 
that would not also be objectionable about other categorical normative reasons.
The problem then with ‘inference to the best explanation’ style arguments is that 
by presupposing at least one normative fact, they have allowed enough normativity 
to plausibly posit objective moral facts by already paying their ontological costs. If 
the response is that doing so only opens the door to epistemic facts rather than to 
moral facts, the door to epistemic facts, in turn, opens the door to moral facts via 
‘companions in guilt’ style arguments, which give reasons to think allowing objective 
epistemic facts paves a path to objective moral facts. While there are objections 
against these sorts of epistemic ‘companions in guilt’ arguments, which attempt 
to show epistemic facts and moral facts are dis-analogous (Cowie 2016, Winokur 
2017) and thus moral realism cannot be argued for by appeal to epistemic realism, 
there is nothing about the argument from expert disagreement that shows there to 
be a meaningful dis-analogy between epistemic and moral facts. In other words, 
it is incumbent on those who would advance ‘inference the best explanation’ style 
arguments for anti-realism to also deal with ‘companions in guilt’ style arguments, 
as they do not provide independent reasons to think allowing as much normativity 
as they do does not pave a plausible path to objective moral facts. ‘Inference to the 
best explanation’ style arguments for anti-realism open paths to moral realism and so 
have a self-undermining nature. Therefore, ‘inference to the best explanation’ style 
arguments for moral anti-realism fail.
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4.3. The evidential (dis)value of disagreement
Another issue for abductive arguments from disagreement is that it is not clear 
that longstanding and widespread expert disagreement counts as evidence for moral 
anti-realism. If disagreement counts as evidence for anti-realism, then agreement 
should count as evidence for realism. However, Hanno Sauer (2019) argues that there 
is, in fact, widespread fundamental agreement on moral matters, and this agreement 
actually supports anti-realism rather than realism. Sauer argues that discovering 
truths in objective domains “requires often painstaking inquiry and methodical 
reasoning, frequently conducted by professional investigators” (Sauer 2019: 346). 
Given the complexity and difficulty of objective domains, widespread agreement 
should not be expected if those domains were in fact objective. 
Conversely, if widespread agreement is evidence that there are no objective moral 
facts, then widespread disagreement would be evidence that there are objective 
moral facts. Sauer’s reasoning can be used to construct an argument in favour 
of moral realism that goes like this: If there is lots of moral disagreement, then 
we can expect there to be objective moral facts. We know there is lots of moral 
disagreement from the empirical evidence. So, we can expect there to be objective 
moral facts. Sauer’s claim that discovering truth in objective domains “requires often 
painstaking inquiry and methodical reasoning, frequently conducted by professional 
investigators” (Sauer 2019: 346), strongly supports the view disagreement amongst 
expert moral philosophers counts in favour of moral realism. As Leiter (2014)
pointed out, moral philosophers have been theorizing and disagreeing for centuries. 
If Sauer is right about objective domains being those which require intense effortful 
inquiry frequently conducted by professionals and we should expect lots of moral 
disagreement if there were objective moral facts, then the fact of widespread and 
longstanding disagreement amongst expert moral philosophers supports moral 
realism rather than anti-realism. This is because moral philosophers have spent 
centuries painstakingly inquiring into morality and there is lots of disagreement 
amongst them. So, it is both the case that there is a lot of disagreement in moral 
philosophy, and moral philosophy is an activity that requires painstaking inquiry 
and methodical reasoning conducted by professional investigators. So, it looks like 
moral philosophy meets Sauer’s criteria for what is to be expected from objective 
domains. Therefore, we can expect that moral philosophy is an objective domain, 
there are objective moral facts, and moral realism is true.
But what has happened here? Expert disagreement is supposed to be evidence 
against moral realism, not evidence in support of it. In Leiter’s view, sustained 
expert disagreement supports anti-realism. In Sauer’s reasoning, sustained expert 
disagreement supports moral realism. So, expert disagreement appears to be both 
evidence for and against moral realism. This cannot be right. That the argument 
from expert disagreement can be used to show moral realism (at least for 
some philosophers) further demonstrates its self-undermining nature. What is 
most plausible, given its contradictory nature, is that the argument from expert 
disagreement supports neither moral realism nor moral anti-realism. That is to say, 
the fact of sustained expert disagreement does not function as evidence for or against 
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moral realism and so has no evidential value relevant to the meta-ethical question of 
whether moral realism is true. Thus, sustained expert disagreement is not a problem 
for moral realism. 
An anti-realist may respond by saying that while certain kinds of disagreement 
do not support moral anti-realism, there could be other kinds of disagreement that 
do. As mentioned previously, folk moral disagreement does not seem to be strong 
evidence in support of moral anti-realism. But perhaps specific kinds of expert 
moral disagreement would be strong evidence in support of moral anti-realism. So, 
a moral anti-realist could say that even if some kinds of expert moral disagreements 
do not support moral anti-realism, there could be some other kinds of expert moral 
disagreements that do.9 However, the burden of proof would be on the anti-realist 
to explain what these specific kinds of disagreement are and why they would be 
relevantly different from any other sort of expert disagreement. The argument 
for moral anti-realism being considered here already appeals to a specific kind of 
disagreement: widespread and longstanding disagreement between expert moral 
philosophers. It is unclear what other kind of disagreement the anti-realist would 
be better off appealing to or how that other kind of disagreement would not fail 
for much of the same reasons the appeal to expert moral disagreement fails. The 
phenomenon of widespread and longstanding disagreement amongst expert moral 
philosophers is the basis of the strongest version of the argument from disagreement 
as it is the sort of disagreement that would least likely be expected. Since the fact of 
such disagreement does not undermine moral realism, it is not clear how other kinds 
of disagreement would.
5. Conclusion
I have presented three arguments against the anti-realist explanation for 
widespread and longstanding disagreement amongst expert moral philosophers. In 
section 4.1, I showed arguments from expert disagreement for moral anti-realism 
have a self-undermining nature. If we can appeal to disagreement amongst expert 
moral philosophers to support moral anti-realism, then we can appeal to disagreement 
amongst expert meta-ethicists to refute meta-ethical realism, which would mean 
moral anti-realism is false. In section 4.2, I explained abductive ‘inference to the best 
explanation’ style arguments for moral anti-realism are also self-undermining, for they 
presuppose the existence of at least one objective normative fact, namely the existence 
of an objectively best explanation for radical disagreement. By presupposing at least 
on objective normative fact, a path to objective moral facts opens up. In section 
4.3, I argued that given how both agreement and disagreement have been appealed 
to in order to support an anti-realist conclusion about the objectivity of morality, it 
is not clear what either is really evidence for. If disagreement supports moral anti-
realism, then agreement should support realism. But, if agreement supports moral 
anti-realism, then disagreement should support moral realism. Given both agreement 
 
9 I thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this point.
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and disagreement have been employed to support moral anti-realism, and the two 
strategies are not compatible with each other, it is most likely that neither agreement 
nor disagreement supports either moral anti-realism or moral realism. I thus conclude 
that widespread and longstanding disagreement amongst expert moral philosophers 
is not a problem for moral realism.
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